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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA” or “Act”) brought 
sweeping changes to the Internal Revenue Code and the overall U.S. tax 
system.  President Trump promised that the Act would be “rocket fuel 
for our economy.”  Trump anticipated that corporations would repatri-
ate offshore profits and use those profits to hire more U.S. workers.  
However, since the Act went into force, economic growth has not in-
creased because corporations have instead used their tax breaks under 
the Act primarily to boost their balance sheets and issue dividends to 
shareholders.   
This Note addresses three key “loopholes” evident in the old U.S. 
tax laws and analyzes how these loopholes were addressed by the TCJA.  
Part II provides a historical understanding  of the inverter loophole, the 
tax haven loophole, and the jobs loophole prior to the TCJA.  Part III 
summarizes key changes implemented by the Act, particularly the do-
mestic and international corporate tax provisions.  Part IV analyzes how 
the Act attempted to address the loopholes under the old tax laws.  Part 
V offers proposals to amend the Act to strengthen some of its provisions 
to help achieve the Act’s objective to be a “rocket fuel” for the U.S. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 22, 2017, President Donald Trump signed “[a]n Act 
to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018,” commonly referred to as 
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the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (“TCJA” or “Act”).1  The TCJA brought 
about the most sweeping changes to the Internal Revenue Code since the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986.2  Despite its significant impact, this legislation 
was drafted hurriedly and under a highly partisan process, denying law-
makers, tax professionals, and the public a reasonable opportunity to as-
sess and comment on many of its complex tax provisions.3  The TCJA 
primarily affects U.S. corporations and how they might achieve corpo-
rate tax efficiencies on their worldwide income.4  The TCJA is estimated 
to increase the U.S. budget deficit by $1.5 trillion over a cumulative ten-
year period.5  President Trump promised that the TCJA would be “rocket 
fuel for [the U.S.] economy . . . [with the] biggest winners [being] eve-
ryday families . . . and [] companies, which will produce the jobs.”6  
However, since the TCJA came into effect, economic growth remains 
substantially unchanged, and the Act, considered alone, has not really 
been responsible for “rocket fuel” powered job growth in the country.7   
This Note addresses three apparent loopholes prevalent under the 
pre-TCJA tax laws and discusses the TCJA’s efforts in addressing them.  
Part II provides a background on the relevant pre-TCJA provisions that 
gave rise to the inverter loophole, the tax haven loophole, and the jobs 
loophole.  Part III gives a summary of the key provisions enacted under 
the TCJA.  Part IV discusses the TCJA’s attempts to address these loop-
holes.  Part V presents proposals on how to strengthen the TCJA to po-
tentially eliminate these loopholes and fulfill its objective as a “rocket 
fuel” for the U.S. economy. 
II. BACKGROUND: PRE-TCJA TAX LOOPHOLES 
This section discusses three loopholes that companies exploited un-
der the old tax laws.  First, the high U.S. domestic corporate tax rate and 
its “worldwide” tax regime gave rise to the inverter loophole.8  Second, 
 
 1. Samuel A. Donaldson, Understanding the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, GA. ST. U. C. OF 
L. 1 (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-07, Jan. 8, 2018), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096078. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Un-
der the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1441-42 (2019). 
 4. Jim Blasingame, The Good, The Bad And the Ugly Of The Tax Cuts And Jobs Act, 
FORBES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimblasingame/2017/12/29/the-good-
the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/#6a8830746cf9. 
 5. See Donaldson, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. Andrew Schwartz & Galen Hendricks, One Year Later, the TCJA Fails to Live Up to 
Its Proponents’ Promises, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.american-
progress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/12/20/464534/one-year-later-tcja-fails-live-pro-
ponents-promises/. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
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the exclusion of certain types of foreign income of a U.S. corporation 
from domestic taxation, coupled with lucrative tax regimes abroad led to 
the tax haven loophole.9  Third, the ineffectiveness of the enforcement 
of tax holidays offered to companies to repatriate their foreign earnings 
created the jobs loophole.10  Together, these loopholes have deemed the 
United States a far less competitive tax regime and have cost the country 
large sums of money in potential tax revenue to bolster the domestic 
economy.   
A. The Inverter Loophole: Pre-TCJA Legislative Efforts 
Prior to the TCJA, the United States had the highest domestic cor-
porate tax rate among developed nations at 35%.11  Additionally, the 
United States followed a “worldwide” tax system.12  Under the “world-
wide” system, the United States taxed U.S. corporations at the 35% do-
mestic rate on their foreign income earned by its foreign branch.13  If a 
U.S. corporation incurred taxes on its foreign income in a foreign juris-
diction, it could claim the foreign tax as a credit against its U.S. tax.14   
Both the high domestic rate and the “worldwide” tax regime were 
seen as the main drivers behind U.S. multinational corporations engag-
ing in corporate inversion.15  In an inversion, a group of companies with 
a common U.S. parent reorganizes its corporate structure such that the 
parent is the company incorporated in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction.16  
The motives behind such inversions are largely tax-driven, as many of 
these companies do not see any managerial or operational benefits from 
moving abroad.17   
 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM, CONG. RES. SERV. NO. R42726, at Sum-
mary (Dec. 1, 2014). 
 12. See Stuart Webber, Escaping the U.S. Tax System: From Corporate Inversions to Re-
Domiciling, 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 273, 277 (July 25, 2011). 
 13. See Melissa Redmiles & Jason Wenrich, A History of Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tions and the Foreign Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 129, 130, 132, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/historycfcftc.pdf (last visited May 14, 2020). 
 14. Elizabeth Chorvat, You Can’t Take it With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate 
Expatriations, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 453, 459-60 (2003). 
 15. See Webber, supra note 12, at 276-79. 
 16. Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion through Inversion, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 807, 808 (2015). 
 17. Webber, supra note 12, at 273. 
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One of the first well-known U.S. corporate inversions occurred in 
1983.18  Oil and gas company McDermott, Inc. inverted under its Pana-
manian subsidiary, McDermott International.19  The inversion enabled 
the McDermott group of companies to “retain, re-invest and redeploy 
earnings from operations outside the United States without subjecting 
such earnings to [U.S.] income tax.”20  As a result of this inversion, 
McDermott, Inc. saved an estimated $200 million in taxes.21   
Since then, Congress has implemented several additional anti-de-
ferral rules to disincentivize corporate inversions.22  The last significant 
addition before the TCJA was Section 7874 under the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, which made it difficult for U.S. corporations to 
invert.23  Section 7874 treats a foreign corporation as a domestic corpo-
ration if, after the inversion, between 60% to 80% of the foreign corpo-
ration’s combined shareholders are the company’s former U.S. share-
holders.24   
Although corporate inversions slowed down after the implementa-
tion of Section 7874, companies circumvented these rules by ensuring 
the ownership of their U.S. shareholders did not carry over to their for-
eign inversions beyond the 60% to 80% threshold.25  U.S. inverters 
achieved this by combining with non-U.S. companies to create larger 
entities of which U.S. shareholders owned a smaller proportion.26  De-
spite Congress’ best efforts, more than fifty U.S. companies have rein-
corporated in low-tax foreign jurisdictions since 1982.27   
 
 18. See Keith Hall, An Analysis of Corporate Inversions, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 1 (Sept. 
2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53093-inver-
sions.pdf. 
 19. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflection on Corporate Inversion Trans-
actions, 95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1793 (2002). 
 20. Steven M. Surdell, Inversions 2014—Self Help International Tax Reform for U.S. 
Multinationals?, 92 TAXES 63, 65 (Mar. 2014). 
 21. Inho Andrew Mun, Reinterpreting Corporate Inversions: Non-Tax Competitions and 
Frictions, 126 YALE L.J. 2152, 2162 (2017). 
 22. See Hwang, supra note 16, at 824-25, 829. 
 23. See Mun, supra note 21, at 2165. 
 24. Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions under 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: 
Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 699, 700, 704 (2010). 
 25. See ERIKA K. LUNDER, CORPORATE INVERSIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED LEGAL 
QUESTIONS, CONG. RES. SERV. NO. R44617, at Summary (Sept. 17, 2016). 
 26. See Surdell, supra note 20, at 79. 
 27. Zachary Mider, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quick-
take/tax-inversion (last updated Mar. 2, 2017). See also Tracking Tax Runaways, 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/ (last updated 
Mar. 1, 2017) (identifying the most popular destinations for U.S. tax inversions). 
 
374 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
B. The Tax Haven Loophole: “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” 
Perhaps the most significant addition to the U.S. anti-inversion reg-
ulations was the introduction of “Subpart F” rules to the Internal Reve-
nue Code under the Revenue Act of 1962.28  Unlike a U.S. corporation’s 
foreign branch income, foreign income earned by a “controlled foreign 
corporation” (“CFC”)29 of a U.S. corporation was not taxable until the 
income was repatriated back to the country.30  Under Subpart F rules, 
certain types of income, such as a corporation’s “foreign personal hold-
ing company income” (“FPHCI”),31 were required to be included in the 
corporation’s U.S. taxable income “regardless of their repatriation to the 
United States.”32  FPHCI includes several types of passive income, such 
as royalties.33  However, royalties received by a U.S. corporation’s for-
eign subsidiary from a related CFC are excluded from FPHCI,34 meaning 
that such royalties are not required to be included in the U.S. corpora-
tion’s taxable income.   
The exclusion of related CFC royalties from FPHCI under Subpart 
F rules gave rise to the tax haven loophole.  Several tax reforms abroad, 
particularly in Europe, played a key role in driving U.S. corporate inver-
sions.35  For instance, between 1982 and 2017, Ireland was a preferred 
destination for a majority of U.S. inverters.36  The Irish corporate tax rate 
is an attractive 12.5%,37 less than half of the pre-TCJA 35% domestic 
rate.38  As Jeffrey L. Rubinger delineates in his article, Death of the 
‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’? Not So Fast, companies such as Apple 
have resorted to creative tax practices such as the “Double Irish with a 
 
 28. Redmiles & Wenrich, supra note 13, at 133. 
 29. See I.R.C. § 957(a) (West 2018) (defining a CFC as a foreign corporation if more 
than 50% of the corporation is owned by a “United States shareholder[.]”  The TCJA defines 
a “United States shareholder” as a U.S. person “who owns . . . 10 percent or more of the total 
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote of such foreign corporation, or 
10 percent or more of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such foreign corpora-
tion.” I.R.C. § 951(b) (West 2017) (emphasis added)). 
 30. Redmiles & Wenrich, supra note 13, at 132. 
 31. Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Death of the ‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’? Not So Fast, 
LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/590806?scroll=1&related=1. 
 32. Redmiles & Wenrich, supra note 13, at 133. 
 33. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Hwang, supra note 16, at 833 (hypothesizing the ease of selling inversions 
to the public and shareholders in Europe may be a driving force behind recent inversions in 
the United States). 
 36. Tracking Tax Runaways, supra note 27. 
 37. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 38. Redmiles & Wenrich, supra note 13, at 130. 
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Dutch Sandwich” to take advantage of the favorable tax laws in Ireland 
and the rest of Europe.39   
1. The “Double Irish” 
A typical “Double Irish” tax structure follows this scheme: First, a 
U.S. parent corporation forms two Irish subsidiaries, for example, Ire-
landCo1 and IrelandCo2.40  Second, IrelandCo1 is incorporated in Ire-
land and domiciled in Bermuda, or any other low- or no-tax jurisdiction 
such as the British Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands.41  IrelandCo2 
is incorporated and domiciled in Ireland as a subsidiary to IrelandCo1.42  
Third, IrelandCo1 holds the company’s intellectual property (“IP”) in 
Bermuda.43  IrelandCo1 licenses its IP to IrelandCo2 and IrelandCo2 
pays royalties in Ireland on its worldwide use of the IP.44  IrelandCo2 
deducts these royalty payments as an expense on its Irish tax return, thus 
reducing its overall Irish tax burden.45  The remaining income of Ire-
landCo2 is taxed at the 12.5% Irish corporate tax rate.46  Since there is 
no corporate tax in Bermuda, IrelandCo1 will not be taxed on the royal-
ties received from IrelandCo2.47 Finally, IrelandCo2 files a check-the-
box election in the U.S. to be considered as a “disregarded entity.”48   
This maneuver effectively disregards the royalties paid by Ire-
landCo2 to IrelandCo1, as both subsidiaries are now treated as a single 
entity for U.S. tax purposes.49  Royalties paid by IrelandCo2 to Ire-
landCo1 are excluded from FPHCI under Subpart F rules, as IrelandCo1 
is subject to tax only on foreign-sourced income besides the IrelandCo2 
royalties, and the deferred royalties are effectively taxed only if it is re-
patriated back to the U.S.50   
 
 39. Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-
aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html. 
 40. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 
376 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
2. The “Dutch Sandwich” 
In some cases, the royalty payments between IrelandCo1 and Ire-
landCo2 may be subject to certain withholding taxes in Ireland.51  How-
ever, in combination with the “Double Irish” structure, the “Dutch Sand-
wich” further helps U.S. corporations reduce their overall effective tax 
rate.  As an example of this approach, consider the following: 
 
a. A company (NetherlandsCo) incorporated and domiciled in the 
Netherlands (or any other European Union-member country) is 
added as a subsidiary of IrelandCo1.  IrelandCo2 is incorporated 
as a subsidiary of NetherlandsCo instead of a subsidiary of Ire-
landCo1.52   
b. IrelandCo1 licenses its IP to NetherlandsCo, which then licenses 
that IP to IrelandCo2.53   
c. NetherlandsCo files a check-the-box election in the U.S. to be 
considered as a “disregarded entity.”54   
 
European Union rules mandate that tax authorities cannot impose 
withholding taxes on payments between EU-resident countries.55  As a 
result, royalty payments between IrelandCo2 and NetherlandsCo are not 
subject to Irish withholding taxes under the “Dutch Sandwich” struc-
ture.56  Further, royalty payments between NetherlandsCo and Ire-
landCo1 are also not subjected to withholding taxes pursuant to the Neth-
erlands tax laws.57   
3. Google: The “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” in Practice 
Google is an important example of a large tech behemoth executing 
the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” to perfection to reduce its overall tax 
bill.  In 2017 alone, Google’s tax structure was instrumental in avoiding 
imposition of U.S. corporate taxes and EU withholding taxes on over 
$22 billion in royalties received by the company’s Bermuda-based sub-
sidiary.58  Google created Google Ireland Holdings as a Bermuda tax-
resident that owns the company’s search and advertising IP for the 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Joseph Boris, Google Shifted $22.8B To Bermuda Via Shell Co., Filing Says, 
LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1115168/google-shifted-22-8b-
to-bermuda-via-shell-co-filing-says. 
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Europe, Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”) region.59  Google Ireland 
Holdings is analogous to the aforementioned IrelandCo1, under which 
Irish subsidiary Google Ireland Ltd. sells advertising space to its custom-
ers.60  Sandwiched in between is Google Netherlands BV, and a Dutch 
intermediary that licenses IP rights from the Bermuda-based Google Ire-
land Holdings before sublicensing it to Google Ireland Ltd.61   
Google Ireland Ltd. pays royalties on customer sales to the com-
pany’s Dutch subsidiary, which is not subject to withholding taxes pur-
suant to EU tax regulations.62  Google Netherlands BV then pays royal-
ties to the Bermuda-based Google Ireland Holdings, which is also not 
subject to withholding taxes pursuant to the Netherlands tax laws.63  Fur-
ther, since Google Ireland Holdings is a Bermuda tax-resident, it is not 
taxed on the royalty income in Ireland.64  Therefore, the royalty income 
is effectively retained tax-free in Bermuda and will only be taxed in the 
U.S. upon repatriation.65   
4. End of the “Double Irish”? 
In response to the corporate tax avoidance strategies adopted via 
the “Double Irish” scheme, the Irish government passed legislation to 
prevent tech companies and other large multinationals from channeling 
their IP royalties tax-free through non-resident Irish subsidiaries.66  The 
legislation phases out current non-resident Irish subsidiaries by the end 
of 2020.67  Moving forward, the legislation requires companies register-
ing in Ireland to claim tax residency in the country, thereby subjecting 
them to the Irish corporate tax rules.68   
However, in addition to blocking the “Double Irish” loophole, the 
Irish government implemented another incentive to remain a competitive 
tax jurisdiction.  The government established a “Knowledge Develop-
ment Box,” for which it would tax Ireland-based IP below the 12.5% 
corporate tax rate.69  Despite the residency requirement for Irish subsid-
iaries, the “Knowledge Development Box” effectively mitigates the 
 
 59. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 66. Ama Sarfo, Ireland Will Quash Tech-Favored ‘Double Irish’ Tax Loophole, LAW360 
(Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/586794. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Ama Sarfo, ‘Double Irish’ Tax Quash Unlikely To Send Cos. Packing, LAW360 (Oct. 
16, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/587549?scroll=1&related=1. 
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effects of this requirement by incentivizing companies to shift their IP to 
Ireland and benefit from the lower tax treatment.70   
5. Apple’s Holy Grail: A Worldwide Non-Resident Corporation 
Apple generates over 70% of its income abroad.71  Apple was a pi-
oneer in the “Double Irish” strategy, stockpiling over $100 billion 
among its Irish subsidiaries before the country proposed to block this 
loophole.72  At that time, Apple’s Irish subsidiaries had not declared tax 
residency in any country.73  In Ireland, tax residency is determined based 
on where the corporation is “managed and controlled,” unlike the United 
States, where tax residency is determined based on country of incorpo-
ration.74  Accordingly, Apple managed to convince the authorities that 
its Irish subsidiaries are “managed and controlled” in the United States, 
and thus avoid Irish tax residency.75  Further, since Apple’s Irish subsid-
iaries were incorporated in Ireland, the company avoided U.S. tax resi-
dency as well.76  As a result, as long as Apple’s foreign earnings re-
mained in Ireland, the company would not be subject to U.S. tax on these 
earnings unless it were repatriated back to the country.77   
However, when the Irish government proposed to shut down the 
“Double Irish” loophole, the company began to rethink its tax structure.78  
This, coupled with a $14.5 billion European tax bill imposed on the com-
pany, forced Apple to declare a tax residency.79  After a thorough inves-
tigation, Apple decided upon Jersey, a small island nation with strong 
ties to the British banking system.80  Jersey is yet another popular tax 
haven that is not subject to EU legislation and does not tax corporate 
income.81   
Accordingly, Apple moved two of its three Irish subsidiaries to Jer-
sey before the 2020 phase out deadline for non-resident Irish subsidiaries 
to declare their Irish residency.82  However, Apple’s third Irish 
 
 70. See id. 
 71. Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter 
for Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/ap-
ple-taxes-jersey.html?module=inline. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Rubinger, supra note 31. 
 75. Drucker & Bowers, supra note 71. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Drucker & Bowers, supra note 71. 
 82. See id. 
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subsidiary declared tax residency in Ireland.83  While the company’s mo-
tives are unclear, experts theorize that the third subsidiary is to be used 
to take advantage of Ireland’s “Knowledge Development Box” legisla-
tion.84  Apple will potentially benefit from over $13 billion in tax deduc-
tions through this generous IP incentive.85   
Overall, U.S. corporations are considered the “global grandmas-
ters” of tax avoidance strategies.86  Companies such as Apple, Google, 
Amazon, and Starbucks have denied several countries approximately 
$240 billion annually in tax revenues.87   
C. The Jobs Loophole: Ineffectiveness of Repatriation Tax Holidays 
The creative inversion methods adopted by U.S. corporations, cou-
pled with the ease of access to foreign tax havens, have led Congress to 
thoroughly deliberate the country’s corporate tax system.88  In 2004, 
when Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act, it created a 
temporary tax holiday for U.S. corporations to repatriate their foreign 
earnings at a reduced 5.25% effective tax rate.89  The reduced rate was 
conditioned upon companies using their repatriated earnings for “domes-
tic investment.”90   
The 5.25% tax holiday was strongly advocated by well-established 
U.S. corporations such as Cisco Systems and Oracle Corporation.91  John 
Chambers, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Cisco Sys-
tems, and Safra Catz, President of Oracle Corporation, argued that these 
repatriation rates were “prohibitive,” particularly when compared to 
other countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, which 
taxed foreign earnings at a nominal 0%-2% rate.92  The 2004 tax holiday 
was therefore perceived to be a useful tool in “creating jobs, investing in 
research, building plants, purchasing equipment, and other uses.”93   
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id.; see also Sarfo, supra note 69. 
 85. Drucker & Bowers, supra note 71. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION 
EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CONG. RES. SERV. NO. 
R40178, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2011). 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., John Chambers & Safra Catz, The Overseas Profits Elephant in the Room, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748704469004575533880328930598#articleTabs%3Darticle. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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In terms of repatriated earnings alone, the tax holiday was success-
ful.  The pharmaceutical and technology industries accounted for ap-
proximately half of the repatriated income.94  Overall, there was a 
“greater-than-eight-fold” increase in repatriations, where approximately 
$265 billion in foreign earnings were transferred from foreign subsidiar-
ies to their respective U.S. parents.95   
However, the tax holiday was sharply criticized because the “do-
mestic investment” requirement was overbroad and not linked to specific 
economic uses such as creating jobs, investing in research, or other do-
mestic benefits.96  The “domestic investment” requirement allowed for 
several categories of reinvestment that companies could pursue, with the 
exception of executive compensation and stock repurchase programs.97   
The tax holiday had an insignificant impact on increasing domestic 
economic activity and boosting job growth.98  Ten of the top fifteen re-
patriating companies suffered job losses between 2004 and 2007.99  Or-
acle, which experienced the largest employment gain among the repatri-
ating companies, only did so by virtue of acquiring other companies.100  
Instead, a loophole in the executive compensation and stock repurchase 
exception to the “domestic investment” requirement allowed a sizeable 
chunk of the repatriated earnings to be spent on such programs.101  Com-
panies were able to take advantage of the stock repurchase exception so 
long as they used only part of their repatriation income to repurchase 
shares.102  Subsequently, the tax holiday achieved an undesired result of 
boosting the corporations’ cash flows without increasing investment in 
the economy.103   
Since the 2004 tax holiday, Congress has considered similar incen-
tives to stimulate the flow of foreign income into the country.104  How-
ever, none of the repatriation proposals were adopted, primarily due to 
the ineffectiveness of foreign repatriation in stimulating U.S. invest-
ment.105   
 
 94. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 88, at 4. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 1, 6. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. at 7-8. 
 99. Id. at 7. 
 100. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 88, at 7. 
 101. See id. at 1, 8. 
 102. See id. at 8. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
 104. See id. at 1. 
 105. See id. 
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III. TCJA: THE ANSWER TO ALL LOOPHOLES? 
Congress enacted the TCJA in an attempt to address the loopholes 
discussed above and bolster the U.S. economy.  This section briefly sum-
marizes some of the changes made to both the domestic106 and interna-
tional107 tax provisions under the TCJA.   
A. Changes to Domestic Tax Provisions 
The centerpiece of the TCJA was the reduction of the domestic cor-
porate tax rate from a statutory maximum of 35% to a flat rate of 21%.108  
The prior four-tiered corporate tax system was replaced by a standard 
21% tax on all C corporations.109  Further, the 21% tax rate is a perma-
nent change to the Internal Revenue Code, unlike some of the other in-
dividual and flow-through tax deductions that phase out over a number 
of years.110   
The reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate is intended to make the 
country more competitive against the various tax jurisdictions abroad.111  
This tax rate also applies for personal services corporations such as 
health, law, and accounting services that were previously subjected to 
the highest tax rates under the tiered system.112  Further, the 21% corpo-
rate tax rate is significantly lower than the maximum individual income 
tax rate of 37%, thereby forcing individuals earning income via flow-
through entities to rethink whether to incorporate as a C corporation.113   
1. Repealing the Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”) 
Another important piece of legislation was repealing the AMT.114  
Under the old AMT rules, a corporation that would normally be taxed 
up to 35% would instead be taxed at 20%, provided they qualified for 
the lower rate.115  However, AMT did not allow corporations to fully 
benefit from deductions for research and development expenses.116   
 
 106. See infra Part III.A. 
 107. See infra Part III.B. 
 108. Kamin et al., supra note 3, at 1445. 
 109. Corporate Tax Reform – Summary of New Laws Taking Effect, BDO USA LLP 1 
(Jan. 2018), https://www.bdo.com/insights/tax/federal-tax/corporate-tax-reform-summary-
of-new-laws. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Tax Reform – KPMG Report on New Tax Law, KPMG 39 (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2018/02/tnf-new-law-book-feb6-2018.pdf. 
 112. BDO USA LLP, supra note 109. 
 113. See KPMG, supra note 111, at 39. 
 114. Donaldson, supra note 1, at 42. 
 115. Id. at 41. 
 116. Yair Holtzman, Sharlene Sylvia & Michael Ganz, INSIGHT: A Tactical Approach to 
R&D Tax Credits for Defense Contractors, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 9, 2018), 
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Repealing AMT helped mitigate some of the complexities apparent 
under the old U.S. tax laws.117  It was therefore perceived to be a positive 
step in allowing companies to claim deductions against their research 
expenses, thereby fueling innovation in the economy.118   
2. Qualified Business Income for Flow-Through Entities 
The TCJA added Section 199A to the Internal Revenue Code.119  
Section 199A allows individual owners of flow-through entities—such 
as sole proprietorships, shareholders in a S corporation, or partner-
ships—to claim a temporary 20% deduction on their “qualified business 
income” (“QBI”).120  QBI includes any trade or business except a “spec-
ified service trade or business” (“SSTB”) or the “trade or business of 
performing services as an employee.”121  On its face, the QBI deductions 
maintain the competitive tax treatment of flow-through entities, because 
QBI deductions guarantee an approximately 10% lower effective tax rate 
to flow-through entities when compared to C corporations.122   
However, there are significant limitations on what actually qualifies 
as QBI.123  For instance, several professional services entities, such as 
healthcare, law firms, and financial services do not qualify for the 20% 
deduction.124  Further, foreign income of all flow-through entities does 
not qualify as QBI.125  Overall, the largest beneficiaries of the QBI de-
duction are primarily businesses that hold more labor and tangible assets 




 117. KPMG, supra note 111, at 40. 
 118. BDO USA LLP, supra note 109, at 2 (AMT was repealed under the TCJA because 
“retaining the corporate AMT could reduce research and development incentives intended to 
improve competitiveness and innovation.”). 
 119. Tony Nitti, Tax Geek Tuesday: Making Sense Of The New ‘20% Qualified Business 
Income Deduction’, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/an-
thonynitti/2017/12/26/tax-geek-tuesday-making-sense-of-the-new-20-qualified-business-in-
come-deduction/#23806b8244fd. 
 120. Id. 
 121. KPMG Report: Analysis and observations of final section 199A regulations, KPMG 
2 (Jan. 24, 2019), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2019/01/tnf-199a-kpmg-re-
port-jan24-2019.pdf. 
 122. Nitti, supra note 119. 
 123. See Kamin et al., supra note 3, at 1460. 
 124. Gunnar Haugen, New QBI Deduction Could Benefit Taxpayers Who Operate Busi-
nesses through Pass-Through Entities, MOSS ADAMS (May 30, 2018), https://www.mos-
sadams.com/articles/2018/may/qualified-business-income-deduction. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Kamin et al., supra note 3, at 1460. 
 
2020] TCJA: MORE LOOPHOLES FOR CORPORATIONS  383 
B. Changes to International Tax Provisions 
The TCJA marked a seismic shift from the worldwide tax system 
with the adoption of the “territorial” system for taxing foreign income.127  
Under this system, a domestic company that holds more than 10% own-
ership in a foreign company is entitled to a 100% deduction on dividend 
income received from these foreign companies.128  Unlike the worldwide 
system,129 the territorial system prevents “double” taxation of a corpora-
tion’s profits both in the U.S. and abroad.130   
1. Repatriation Tax on Accumulated Foreign Income 
Similar to the tax holiday provided in 2004, the TCJA introduced a 
one-time repatriation tax on a U.S. corporation’s foreign earnings that 
had previously been saved abroad and are now repatriated.131  This one-
time repatriation tax applies to the last taxable year of a corporation’s 
deferred foreign income before January 1, 2018, and it taxes the greater 
of the corporation’s accumulated foreign earnings and profits either as 
of November 2, 2017, or December 31, 2017.132  This provision taxes 
repatriated foreign earnings held in cash at a reduced rate of 15.5%, 
while other repatriated foreign earnings held in illiquid assets are taxed 
at 8%.133  Further, the TCJA allows corporations to pay this repatriation 
 
 127. See generally Eric Toder, Territorial Taxation: Choosing Among Imperfect Options, 
AEI ECON. PERSP. (Dec. 2017), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Territorial-
Taxation.pdf. 
 128. IRS Newsroom, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Comparison for Large Businesses and 
International Taxpayers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-a-comparison-for-large-businesses-
and-international-taxpayers (last updated Sept. 11, 2019) (explaining that “[a] 100 percent 
deduction is allowed for the foreign-source portion of dividends received from specified 10-
percent owned foreign corporations by domestic corporations that are U.S. shareholders §of 
[sic] those foreign corporations.”). 
 129. See Chorvat, supra note 14, at 459-60 (discussing the “worldwide” tax system, where 
a U.S. corporation’s foreign-sourced earnings are subject to taxes in their respective countries. 
The corporation subsequently receives a foreign tax credit to offset their foreign income 
taxes.). 
 130. Toder, supra note 127, at 2. 
 131. Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huang, Repatriation Tax Holiday Would Lose And Is a 
Proven Policy Failure, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 3 (June 19, 2014), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/repatriation-tax-holiday-would-lose-revenue-and-is-a-
proven-policy-failure (explaining that “the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) . . . en-
acted a one-time ‘dividend repatriation tax holiday’ that allowed firms to bring overseas prof-
its back to the United States at a dramatically reduced tax rate during 2005 and 2006.”). 
 132. I.R.S. Notice 2018-07, at 1-2 (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-
18-07.pdf. 




384 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
tax over an extended eight-year period.134  Although this provision gen-
erally applies to C corporations, S corporations also benefit from the re-
duced repatriation tax rate and further benefit by being permitted to defer 
this tax on their foreign earnings until they “sell[] substantially all of 
[their] assets, cease[] to conduct business, change[] its tax status, or the 
electing shareholder transfers its stock.”135   
It was estimated that this one-time repatriation tax would help cause 
“all of [the foreign earnings] to come back into [the United States].”136  
Indeed, when President Trump signed the TCJA into law, it was esti-
mated that U.S. corporations held $2.6 trillion in foreign earnings 
abroad.137  Apple capitalized on this provision, promising to repatriate 
most of its $252 billion in foreign earnings, subsequently incurring a 
sizeable $38 billion tax on their repatriated income.138  Other companies 
have also followed suit; and by the first half of 2018, U.S. corporations 
repatriated an estimated $218 billion in foreign earnings.139  Since then, 
however, repatriation activity has slowed.140  U.S. corporations booked 
an estimated $37 billion in repatriated foreign earnings during the third 
quarter of 2018.141   
2. Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income 
The TCJA introduces a tax on “global intangible low-taxed in-
come” (“GILTI”).142  This provision attempts to prevent corporations 
from shifting profits outside the United States.143  GILTI imposes a min-
imum 10.5% tax on certain types of income, namely “highly mobile 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Richard Phillips, New Study Confirms Offshore Earnings are Flowing into Stock 
Buybacks, Not Jobs and Investments, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y (Sept. 7, 2018) (here-
inafter “Offshore Earnings Are Flowing into Stock Buybacks”), https://itep.org/new-study-
confirms-offshore-earnings-are-flowing-into-stock-buybacks-not-jobs-and-investments/. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Brian X. Chen, Apple, Capitalizing on New Tax Law, Plans 
to Bring Billions in Cash Back to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/01/17/technology/apple-tax-bill-repatriate-cash.html. 
 139. See Safehaven, U.S. Companies No Longer Repatriating Foreign Profits, NASDAQ 
(Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/us-companies-no-longer-repatriating-for-
eign-profits-cm1073422. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kamin et al., supra note 3, at 1490. 
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income” such as patent income.144  The 10.5% tax is effective until 2025, 
after which the effective GILTI rate goes up to 13.125%.145   
3. Foreign-derived Intangible Income 
The “foreign-derived intangible income” (“FDII”) provision taxes 
certain earnings at a reduced 13.125% effective rate.146  FDII is income 
that is “derived from exporting U.S.-generated goods and services and 
attributable to intangible business assets.”147  FDII essentially works as 
an export subsidy with the goal to keep U.S.-developed IP within the 
country.148   
4. Base Erosion and Anti-abuse Tax 
The “base erosion and anti-abuse tax” (“BEAT”) imposes an addi-
tion tax liability on certain U.S. corporations that significantly reduce 
their domestic tax liability by making payments to a foreign affiliate.149  
BEAT increases a corporation’s overall tax base by excluding tax bene-
fits they receive from “base erosion payments.”150  BEAT proposes to 
mitigate some of the corporate inversion issues apparent under the old 
tax laws,151 as it  applies broadly to both foreign subsidiaries and foreign 
parent corporations.152   
IV. THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
A. The Inverter Loophole: Skipping the BEAT 
The inverter problem resulted from the high 35% statutory tax rate 
and U.S. tax law that permitted multinational corporations to avoid 
 
 144. Gordon Gray, Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income Taxation – A Primer, AM. 
ACTION F. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/global-intangi-
ble-low-taxed-income-taxation-a-primer/. 
 145. Eric Toder, Explaining the TCJA’s International Reforms, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 2, 
2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/explaining-tcjas-international-reforms (“Be-
tween 2018 and 2025, companies can claim a 50 percent deduction for GILTI, creating a 10.5 
percent effective rate . . . . After 2025, the GILTI deduction declines to 37.5%, the effective 
tax rate increases to 13.125%, and GILTI will apply in countries with corporate rates of less 
than 16.406%.”). 
 146. Chris William Sanchirico, The New U.S. Tax Preference for “Foreign-Derived In-
tangible Income”, 71 TAX L. REV. 625, 630 (2018). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Kamin et al., supra note 3, at 1498-99. 
 149. Id. at 1507. 
 150. See id. (defining “base erosion payments” as “deductible amounts paid to the foreign 
affiliate, such as interest, amounts paid to the foreign affiliate in connection with depreciable 
or amortizable property, and certain reinsurance premiums”). 
 151. See id. (discussing that under the old tax laws, interest payments made to foreign 
parent corporations were tax deductible). 
 152. Id. 
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paying tax on unrepatriated foreign earnings.153  While the TCJA posi-
tively brought down the corporate tax rate to 21%, its shift from a world-
wide to a territorial corporate tax system did little to nothing to solve the 
inverter problem.154  Although statistical evidence of inversions since the 
passage of the TCJA is not yet available, two major loopholes exist that 
only serve to incentivize corporations to get more creative with inverting 
to their foreign affiliates: the tax haven loophole and the jobs loophole.  
These loopholes are discussed in more detail following this section.155   
1. Problems with BEAT 
BEAT significantly broadened the scope of the tax laws by impos-
ing tax liability on payments made to both foreign subsidiaries and par-
ent corporations.156  In theory, this was a positive step towards mitigating 
corporate inversions since U.S. companies previously were permitted to 
deduct payments made to foreign parents from their overall tax base.  
However, the current BEAT legislation simply lacks the punch neces-
sary to curb inverting corporations.   
First, BEAT applies only to multinationals with average revenues 
above $500 million over a three-year period.157  This automatically ex-
cludes several U.S. corporations that have previously inverted abroad.158  
Second, BEAT applies only when the corporation’s tax benefits from the 
base erosion payments are more than 3% of their overall deductions.159  
Third, the base erosion payments do not include cost of goods sold.160  
This potentially allows companies to classify their foreign IP-related 
royalties as cost of goods sold and avoid incurring BEAT liability.161  
Finally, BEAT imposes a meagre 10% liability on the excess tax benefits 
received from the corporation’s base erosion payments.162  This is hardly 
a deterrent for corporate inversions when the tax rate for U.S. earnings 
is more than double this amount (i.e., 21%).163   
 
 153. See supra Part II.A. 
 154. See supra Part II.A. 
 155. See infra Part IV.B-C. 
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 157. Kamin et al., supra note 3, at 1508. 
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 159. Richard Phillips, Understanding and Fixing the New International Corporate Tax 
System, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y, at 9 (July 17, 2018), https://itep.org/understand-
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standing and Fixing the New International Corporate Tax System]. 
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2. Subpart F Issues 
Under the old Subpart F rules, FPHCI included passive and mobile 
income such as interest, dividends, royalties, and rent payments that 
were taxed when earned, not repatriated.164  The typical passive income 
targeted was IP-related and highly mobile, as evidenced by the plethora 
of U.S. corporations restructuring their IP abroad.165  The purpose of  
Subpart F was to deter U.S. corporations from engaging in inversion ac-
tivity by taxing their highly mobile income at the domestic rates imme-
diately when they are earned.166  However, corporations were still able 
to beneficially take advantage of inversions due to the check-the-box 
election rules, which allowed corporations to elect their foreign affiliate 
as a “disregarded entity” and effectively cause some of the highly mobile 
Subpart F income to be “disregarded” for U.S. tax purposes.167   
The TCJA went a step further in compounding the corporate inver-
sion issues associated with the Subpart F rules.  The new Subpart F rules 
broaden the definition of a U.S. shareholder,168 which effectively ex-
pands the definition of foreign “passive income” and thus excludes cer-
tain foreign earnings by individuals from U.S. taxation.169  By filing a 
simple check-the-box election, the new Subpart F rules now allow both 
corporations and wealthy individuals to shelter their profits abroad, 
thereby undermining the anti-inversion objectives of the TCJA.170   
B. The Tax Haven Loophole: Everyone Is GILTI 
With BEAT, GILTI was another corporate tax provision that was 
problematic in the TCJA.  Both these provisions were introduced with a 
goal to impose tax on earnings by U.S. corporations’ foreign affiliates 
and investments.171  Both GILTI and BEAT were meant to offset some 
of the costs associated with the switch to a territorial tax system.  How-
ever, while BEAT gives companies an incentive to shift their intangible 
assets, GILTI incentivizes companies to move their tangible assets to 
low-tax jurisdictions, and potentially avoid incurring any GILTI liability 
 
 164. See Limitation on Deduction for Dividends Received From Certain Foreign Corpo-
rations and Amounts Eligible for Section 954 Look-Through Exception, 84 Fed. Reg. 28398 
(June 18, 2019). See also I.R.C. § 954(c) (West 2017). 
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holders, More Attribution, More Compliance, 5 RUCHELMAN INSIGHTS 17, 18 (Apr. 1, 2018), 
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on their foreign income.172  This creates significant economic issues that 
directly oppose the intended objectives of the TCJA.   
1. Shifting Tangible Assets to Tax Havens 
GILTI taxes a company’s foreign income, but only if that income 
is more than 10% of the corporation’s foreign tangible asset value.173  
The determination of GILTI based on a corporation’s foreign tangible 
assets potentially creates three significant issues.   
First, U.S. corporations that generate foreign income below 
GILTI’s 10% tangible asset threshold may entirely avoid the tax.174  Sec-
ond, corporations now have an incentive to shift more of their tangible 
assets abroad to increase the offshore base that is not subject to taxa-
tion.175  Third, the 10% threshold on tangible assets is significantly 
higher than the average return on these investments, which means that a 
corporation may rarely incur GILTI liability on their foreign assets.176   
The rationale behind deciding upon the 10% foreign tangible asset 
threshold was that any foreign income in excess of that threshold must 
come from a corporation’s foreign intangible assets.177  The legislators 
assumed that tangible assets typically make a 10% return on their invest-
ment, which is rarely the case.178  Although GILTI attempts to deter com-
panies from moving their intangible assets abroad via limits on their for-
eign tangible assets, it only incentivizes companies to move even more 
of their tangible assets abroad to shield their offshore profits from any 
GILTI liability.179   
 
 172. Although the GILTI moniker implies a corporation’s intangible income, GILTI in-
cludes both tangible and intangible income, with certain exceptions that are over the provi-
sion’s 10% tangible asset threshold. See Phillips, Understanding and Fixing the New Interna-
tional Corporate Tax System, supra note 159, at 5-7. 
 173. Id. at 5. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.; see also Phillips, Understanding and Fixing the New International Corporate 
Tax System, supra note 159. 
 176. Chuck Marr, Brendan Duke & Chye-Ching Huang, New Tax Law Is Fundamentally 
Flawed and Will Require Basic Restructuring, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 19 
(last updated Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/new-tax-law-is-fun-
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assets . . . .”). 
 178. See id. (discussing that the 10 percent GILTI threshold is “well above a ‘routine’ rate 
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2. GILTI Taxes Unintended Targets 
The problem with GILTI’s application is that the tax has inadvert-
ently targeted companies that have little to no intangible assets abroad.180  
This speaks further to the TCJA’s inadvertent result in being a detriment 
to labor-intensive industries at the expense of intangible-driven tech gi-
ants receiving the bulk of the TCJA’s benefits.   
Since the TCJA was signed, two major companies have uninten-
tionally felt the adverse effects of the GILTI liability.181  Kansas City 
Southern, a railroad company, was recently slapped with a $25 million 
GILTI liability, despite having no income attributable to any intangible 
assets held abroad.182  Similarly, container giant Tupperware reported a 
roughly 12% increase in their effective tax rate since the TCJA was en-
acted, citing GILTI as a source for the bulk of its rate hike.183   
The logic behind GILTI in taxing U.S. corporations with unusually 
high returns on their foreign investments is sound. However, determin-
ing GILTI based on a company’s foreign tangible assets is flawed.  For 
example, several labor-intensive companies with long-held tangible as-
sets have already depreciated those assets and have no significant tax 
basis remaining to calculate GILTI.184  On the other hand, service-ori-
ented companies typically do not hold significant tangible assets.185  
Both these types of companies are slapped with GILTI as all their for-
eign income appears to generate a higher than 10% return on their neg-
ligible tangible assets held abroad.186   
The result of this is that GILTI strays away from its intended pur-
pose of targeting highly mobile intangible-related income resulting from 
trademarks and patents.187  Further, without any mechanism to distin-
guish between tangible and intangible foreign income, GILTI will con-
tinue taxing unintended companies without intangible-related income, 
and detrimentally affect their ability to fuel the economy.188   
 
 180. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin & James Carter, New ‘GILTI’ tax is killing private enter-
prise, and it must be fixed, THE HILL (Sept. 17, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/fi-
nance/406968-new-gilti-tax-is-killing-private-enterprise-and-it-must-be-fixed. 
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C. The Jobs Loophole: More Money for No Jobs 
1. Repatriation Does Not Work 
During the 2016 presidential elections, President Trump had prof-
fered to “turn America into a magnet for new jobs” by promising to re-
form the country’s tax code.189  Subsequently, the TCJA was introduced 
with the goal of boosting innovation and employment in the country.190  
In order to boost jobs, the TCJA included several repatriation provisions 
that proponents hoped would encourage U.S. corporations to repatriate 
most of the estimated $2.6 trillion that they held offshore.191   
The TCJA was estimated to increase the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product by 1.7%, create 339,000 new jobs, and boost wages by 1.5%.192  
In the first quarter of 2018 alone, U.S. corporations brought back roughly 
$300 billion of their offshore earnings, compared to $312 billion repat-
riated during the entirety of the 2004 tax holiday.193  Out of the $300 
billion, publicly traded companies accounted for about $143 billion in 
foreign earnings.194   
Out of the $143 billion repatriated by public companies, Cisco and 
drug manufacturer Gilead Sciences accounted for two-thirds of the re-
patriated income.195  A majority of the foreign earnings repatriated 
through the one-time repatriation tax have been associated with a signif-
icant uptick in U.S. corporations engaging in stock buyback programs.196  
While the Trump administration argues that stock buyback programs al-
low shareholders to reinvest the extra cash they receive in the domestic 
economy, some argue that stock buybacks help the corporate investors 
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over domestic workers.197  Below is a list of investments made by major 
tech companies that have repatriated or promised to repatriate their for-
eign earnings after the TCJA: 
 
a. Apple spent $22.8 billion in stock buyback programs during the 
first quarter of 2018.198   
b. Cisco repatriated $67 billion and used the money to increase its 
dividends and buy back $31 billion of stock.199   
c. AT&T announced a plan to spend $1 billion on employee bo-
nuses to over 200,000 employees.200   
d. Juniper Networks repatriated $3 billion in overseas cash and an-
nounced plans to buy back $2 billion in shares.201   
e. Verizon repatriated $4 billion in foreign earnings and plans to in-
vest in its own investment fund and boost contributions to em-
ployee pension plans.202   
f. Alphabet, the parent company of Google, does not plan to change 
any of its investment goals and strategies despite the repatriation 
break.203   
 
In addition to the one-time repatriation tax, companies such as the 
ones listed above also aim to benefit from the GILTI rules in repatriating 
their overseas earnings.  Once the one-time repatriation tax lapses, 
GILTI essentially cuts the U.S. corporations’ tax on foreign earnings by 
half at 10.5%, compared to the domestic 21% tax rate.204  This is detri-
mental for most small- and medium-sized companies, which primarily 
make their money in the United States.205  Instead of boosting domestic 
investments, both the one-time repatriation tax and the new international 
tax provisions effectively work to increase the income of the corporate 
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shareholder, and incentivize companies to send jobs overseas to reduce 
their effective tax rates.206   
2. Small Businesses Get Hurt the Most 
Prior to the TCJA, large U.S. technology corporations, such as 
eBay, Cisco, and Google, had an average effective tax rate of below 
20%.207  The TCJA introduced the GILTI minimum tax to mainly target 
companies that sheltered their earnings abroad.208  However, the 10.5% 
GILTI minimum tax has created an apparent disadvantage for startups 
and small businesses while these technology giants are expected to ben-
efit the most out of the TCJA’s GILTI rules.   
Many large multinational corporations, including Apple, Microsoft, 
and Google, make much of their earnings abroad.209  The 10.5% GILTI 
minimum tax reduces these companies’ effective tax rates by half, com-
pared to domestic startups that mostly make their money in the United 
States.210  This creates an “uneven playing field” where domestic 
startups and small business are taxed at 21%, while large multinationals 
get a lower tax rate via the GILTI minimum tax.211   
The unequal treatment of domestic and multinational corporations 
is more prominent in the technology industry that has now been at the 
forefront of the U.S. economy for decades.212  Rising inequality among 
startups and tech giants is destined to slow down innovation in the econ-
omy, as the technology giants become more cash rich under the various 
repatriation breaks provided by the TCJA.  As they become cash rich, 
they become even more capable of increasing their control over the mar-
ket through strategic acquisitions and investments in domestic startups 
 
 206. See Richard Phillips, New Legislation Aims to Change Tax Law Provisions That In-
centivize Outsourcing, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://itep.org/new-legislation-aims-to-fix-tax-law-provisions-that-incentivizes-outsourc-
ing-and-moving-profits-offshore/ (discussing General Motors’ plans to lay off 14,000 U.S. 
workers to focus on manufacturing SUVs and other vehicles that are primarily produced out-
side the United States). 
 207. Douglas MacMillan, Richard Rubin & Jay Greene, Tax Plan Strikes at Tech Giants’ 
Foreign Profits, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-plan-strikes-
at-tech-giants-foreign-profits-1513613403. 
 208. Briefing Book, Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-global-intangible-low-taxed-income-
and-how-it-taxed-under-tcja (last visited May 8, 2020); see also Kyle Pomerleau, What’s Up 
with Being GILTI?, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/gilti-2019/. 
 209. Farhad Manjoo, What the Tax Bill Fails to Address: Technology’s Tsunami, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/technology/tax-bill-technol-
ogy.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. 
 
2020] TCJA: MORE LOOPHOLES FOR CORPORATIONS  393 
and small businesses.213  On the other hand, the reduced cash available 
to startup companies is detrimental to boosting innovation and competi-
tion in the U.S. economy.  Given that some of the large technology giants 
have used their billions in repatriated cash on strengthening their respec-
tive balance sheets, the unequal treatment under the TCJA creates uncer-
tainty in meeting one of the Act’s central goals, namely to boost U.S. job 
growth.   
V. PROPOSAL 
The TCJA has done little to address the inverter, tax haven, and the 
jobs loopholes discussed under the old tax laws.  Instead, it benefits the 
wealthy with significant tax breaks rather than being the promised source 
of relief to middle-class and low-income households.  Further, the Con-
gressional Budget Office expects the TCJA to increase the country’s def-
icit by approximately $1 to $2 trillion over ten years.214  This deficit is 
largely due to an estimated $1.65 trillion reduction in revenues from 
taxes during nearly the same period.215  Many of the revenue issues are 
attributable to the huge repatriation breaks offered to corporations.216  
The favorable tax rates afforded to multinational corporations have cre-
ated an apparent unequal treatment of large corporations relative to 
startups and small businesses.217  Large multinational corporations have 
benefited by bringing home large chunks of foreign earnings that have 
been invested in boosting their own value.  Furthermore, the lack of re-
investment of foreign repatriated earnings in U.S. product development 
has circumvented the TCJA’s goal of boosting investments in the U.S. 
economy and creating jobs within the country, as there is little to no ev-
idence of such investments made by the repatriating companies since the 
TCJA was enacted.   
In light of the issues highlighted above, some of the TCJA’s provi-
sions that incentivize inversions, induce the use of tax havens, and fail 
to boost domestic jobs could be strengthened with the suggestions be-
low.   
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A. Closing the Inverter Loophole 
The introduction of BEAT under the TCJA was seen as a significant 
step in eliminating corporate inversion activity.  The various thresholds 
instituted under BEAT were far too high to incur any tax liability on 
foreign earnings, meaning the target corporations went largely unaf-
fected by the anti-inversion measures under the TCJA.218   
Lowering BEAT’s $500 million average earnings threshold would 
automatically broaden its target base of multinational corporations that 
would incur liability on their excess foreign earnings.219  BEAT should 
also include cost of goods sold while calculating liability.220  This change 
would effectively prevent the large technology giants from avoiding 
BEAT liability by classifying IP-related foreign royalties as cost of 
goods sold.   
In addition, lawmakers should redefine what constitutes a “foreign 
corporation” under the TCJA.221  Under the TCJA, a foreign corporation 
should include those that are managed, controlled, or owned by a U.S. 
parent.222  Broadening the definition of a foreign corporation will help 
reduce anti-inversion activity and help keep goods and services and in-
tangible assets created by U.S. companies within the country.   
B. Closing the Tax Haven Loophole 
Both GILTI and FDII create confusion regarding which provision 
is applicable to a U.S. corporation’s foreign earnings.  However, the key 
difference between GILTI and FDII is that GILTI imposes a 10.5% min-
imum tax, whereas FDII imposes a slightly higher 13.125% tax.223  The 
disparity between these provisions leaves room for corporations exploit-
ing GILTI to lower their effective tax rate on foreign earnings by ex-
panding their tangible asset base abroad.   
To close this loophole, the first step should be to equalize the two 
provisions by raising the GILTI minimum tax to 13.125%.224  Second, 
U.S. corporations should instead be taxed on a per-country basis.  Under 
a per-country approach, U.S. corporations would pay taxes based on the 
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country in which they generate income.225  This idea was previously pro-
posed in Congress, and it marks a complete reform to prevent U.S. cor-
porations from keeping their earnings in offshore tax havens.226  Lastly, 
companies should not be allowed to use their foreign tax credits from 
high-tax jurisdictions to offset their GILTI liability on earnings gener-
ated in low-tax jurisdictions.227  These measures would significantly in-
crease the difficulty in shifting profits abroad and raise revenue for the 
government to facilitate job growth in the country.   
Another measure to close the tax haven loophole could be to adopt 
a “combined reporting” system.228  This system is already in place in 
several states.229  It requires U.S. corporations to disclose their profits 
attributable to each state in which they perform activities.230  This ap-
proach could be modified to apply to a U.S. corporations’ worldwide 
income, where companies must disclose their profits attributable to each 
country in which they exist.231  The combined reporting approach could 
be modified further to pay attention to a U.S. corporation’s activity in 
offshore tax havens.232  Companies could then be taxed based on their 
income in each tax haven where they perform activities.  Adding this 
approach to the current legislation would increase transparency and min-
imize the incentive of U.S. corporations to move to tax havens abroad.   
C. Closing the Jobs Loophole 
One of the perceived negative implications of the TCJA is the rise 
in income inequality between the large tech giants and the smaller 
startups and businesses who make most of their money in the United 
States.  To address this inequality, the TCJA must expand the protections 
currently afforded to small businesses and startups in order to boost in-
novation and job growth in the country.   
 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Rep. Peter DeFazio Introduces Legislation to Help Stop Moving US Jobs Over-
seas, U.S. CONGRESSMAN PETER DEFAZIO (Jun. 6, 2018), https://defazio.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/rep-peter-defazio-introduces-legislation-to-help-stop-multinational. 
 227. See Richard Phillips, New Legislation Would Close Significant Offshore Loopholes 
in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y (Jun. 6, 2018), 
https://itep.org/new-legislation-would-close-significant-offshore-loopholes-in-the-tax-cuts-
and-jobs-act/. 
 228. Richard Phillips & Nathan Proctor, A Simple Fix for a $17 Billion Loophole: How 
States Can Reclaim Revenue Lost to Tax Havens, INST. ON TAX’N AND ECON. POL’Y 1 (Jan. 
17, 2019), https://itep.org/a-simple-fix-for-a-17-billion-loophole/. 
 229. Id. (discussing that twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have incorpo-
rated “combined reporting” systems). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. at 2 (suggesting a worldwide combined reporting known as “complete report-
ing”). 
 232. See id. 
 
396 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
The TCJA should offer the QBI deductions as a permanent provi-
sion to flow-through entities.  Under the current legislation, QBI deduc-
tions are temporary and expire by the end of 2025.233  This potentially 
raises uncertainties with the QBI deduction’s longevity, and its pur-
ported benefits offered to flow-through entities.  Such entities may thus 
consider reorganizing into a C corporation, who are imposed with a “21 
percent tax rate without an expiration date” under the TCJA.234  Moving 
to a C corporation structure is expensive and unnecessary for many flow-
through entities.235  Making QBI deductions permanent would restore 
some parity in the tax treatment of corporations and flow-through enti-
ties under the TCJA, as small businesses do not have to reconsider their 
entity structure.  Further, this would avoid a potential drain on the econ-
omy by exploiting the one-sided benefits currently offered to C corpora-
tions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The TCJA has left a lot to be desired.  It has failed to address the 
three big loopholes: the inverter, tax haven, and the jobs loophole, and 
has instead incentivized corporations to shift their profits and invest-
ments abroad.  The inadvertent effect of the TCJA is that U.S. corpora-
tions will continue to shift profits overseas while simultaneously becom-
ing cash rich through the various repatriation breaks offered to them.  A 
majority of the issues emanating from the TCJA result from a lack of 
guidance to the taxpayers on navigating the newly introduced provisions 
under the Act.  Accordingly, lawmakers should strive to make the nec-
essary tweaks to fulfill the “rocket fuel” promise of the TCJA, and help 
boost innovation and job growth while keeping much of its valuable 
goods, services, and intangible assets within the country.   
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